Selected rules of statutory interpretation in California

There are numerous rules of statutory construction used by the courts in California. Those involved in the development and implementation of state legislation should be aware of some of these principles. The purpose of this article is to briefly summarize several of those key principles for those working in and around the State Capitol.

The purpose of statutory construction or statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature in enacting the particular statute or statutory language. As the courts in this state have explained, “The rules governing statutory construction are well established. Our objective is to ascertain and effectuate [the] legislative intent.” (City of Huntington Beach v. Board of Administration (1992) 4 Cal.4th 462, 468; Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 663 (Mejia).)

The court’s fundamental task in construing a statute is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent and effectuate the law’s purpose. In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 406

The courts in California always begin with a review of the statutory language and whether it is “clear on its face.” In determining legislative or voter intent, “we first look to the language itself.” (Mejia, 31 Cal.4th at p. 663.) “If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature. . ..” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727)

“But the `plain meaning’ rule does not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose. . ..” (Ibid.) Moreover, “`where a word of common usage has more than one meaning, the one which will best attain the purposes of the statute should be adopted, even though the ordinary meaning of the word is thereby enlarged or restricted and especially in order to avoid absurdity or to prevent injustice.’ [Citation.]” (People ex rel. S.F. Bay etc. Com. v. Town of Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 543-544.)

If there is ambiguity in the statutory language, then the courts of this state look at extrinsic evidence to help determine legislative intent. Ambiguity, according to the California courts, means the language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.

When the language is ambiguous, “we refer to other indicia of legislative or voter intent such as legislative history, public policy, or analyses and arguments contained in the official voter information guide. (Robert L. supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 900-901; Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 508, 519].) Our task is simply to interpret and apply the language of a statute or initiative so as to effectuate the Legislature’s or electorate’s respective intent. (Ibid.)”

Courts must also construe words in context (i.e., how they fit into the rest of the statutory scheme), “keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 (Dyna-Med).) “Every statute, then, should be construed in light of the whole system of law of which it is a part, so that all may be harmonized and have effect.” (Mejia, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 663.)

The following are important concepts of statutory interpretation in this state, and citations to several relevant appellate court decisions that explain key statutory construction principles:

Statutory construction rules can provide valuable tools to use in interpreting and drafting statutes. (California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 269.) Nonetheless, these tools are not mandatory rules that courts must follow in every instance. (Chickasaw Nation v. U.S. (2001) 534 U.S. 84, 94.) Instead, they are just guides that courts use to help arrive at the intent of the Legislature. (Ibid.)

The plain language of a statute should guide. When the meaning is clear and there is no ambiguity, there is ordinarily no need to employ rules of statutory construction. In re W.B., Jr. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 52 If the statutory language is unambiguous, the court presumes that the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls. In re Lucas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 839, 849 In addition, the proper goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, giving the words of the statute their usual and ordinary meaning.

In determining whether there is ambiguity in the language, a party demonstrates statutory ambiguity by tendering an alternative candidate of meaning, that is, a grammatically plausible reading of the language at issue. Collins v. Sutter Memorial Hosp. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1, 14

If the statutory language may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute. People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265

In addition, language should be construed consistent with the statutory framework it is a part of. In re C.H. (2011) 53 Cal.4th 94, 100 In construing a statute, courts harmonize the various parts of the enactment by considering them in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.

In addition, when interpreting a statute, a court will give significance to every word, phrase, and sentence. Statutory language is construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme, and courts give significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuing the legislative purpose. In re D.S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097

One principle – in pari materia – requires statutes related to the same subject to be interpreted consistently. City of Alhambra v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 707, 722 Furthermore, when code sections address the same matter or subject, courts must construe them together as one statute.

And, to understand the intended meaning of a statutory phrase, the court may consider use of the same or similar language in other statutes, because similar words or phrases in statutes in pari materia, that is, dealing with the same subject matter, ordinarily will be given the same interpretation. People v. Coker (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 581, 588-589

Another principle – Ejusdem generis – tells courts that, where words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons, things or activities, the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons, things or activities of the same general nature or class as those enumerated.  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters (1979) 25 Cal.3d 317, 330-331

Another principle – Expressio unius est exclusio alterius – provides that the enumeration of acts, things or persons as coming within the operation or exception of a statute will preclude the inclusion by implication in the class covered or excepted of other acts, things or persons. People v. Quiroz (2011) 199 Cal.App.4^th 1123, 1130

Another principle – the last antecedent rule – generally provides that qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 148, 153

In regards to prospective versus retroactive application of a statute, in California, a statute is presumed to operate prospectively. In construing statutes, there is a presumption against retroactive application unless the Legislature plainly has directed otherwise by means of express language of retroactivity or other sources that provide a clear and unavoidable implication that the Legislature intended retroactive application. Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 955

Regarding general versus specific statutory language, in California, to the extent a specific statute is inconsistent with a general statute potentially covering the same subject matter, the specific statute must be read as an exception to the more general statute. Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 9 Cal.4th 836, 857

Regarding recently-enacted versus earlier-enacted statutes, in California, if inconsistent statutes cannot otherwise be reconciled, “a particular or specific provision will take precedence over a conflicting general provision.” The Supreme Court has confirmed that “‘where the general statute standing alone would include the same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute whether it was passed before or after such general enactment’.” Stone Street Capital, LLC v. California State Lottery Com’n (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 109, 119

Stated another way, “When two or more statutes concern the same subject matter and are in irreconcilable conflict, the doctrine of implied repeal provides that the most recently enacted statute expresses the will of the Legislature, and thus to the extent of the conflict impliedly repeals the earlier enactment.” In re Thierry S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 727, 744

California courts generally strive to uphold a state statute. For example, a statute should be construed to preserve its constitutionality. The burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests on the party assailing it, and courts may not declare a legislative classification invalid unless, viewed in the light of facts made known or generally assumed, it is of a character that precludes the assumption that the classification rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators. In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1152

As set forth in many of California’s 29 Codes that contain over 156,000 statutory provisions, the courts of this state differentiate between the terms “may” and “shall.” Courts ordinarily construe the word “may” as permissive and the word “shall” as mandatory, particularly when a single statute uses both terms. Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 538, 542

Finally, California courts are allowed to consider specified extrinsic aids in assisting them to ascertain legislative intent. The Third District Court of Appeal in this state set forth which extrinsic aids are permissible or not to be used by courts. Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 31

Where a statute’s terms are unclear or ambiguous, courts may look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. In re M.M. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 530, 536 Both the legislative history of a statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered in ascertaining the legislative intent. People v. Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 977